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CRIMINAL LAW-MANDATORY JAIL SENTENCES: AN EFFECTIVE SOLUTION
To THE DRUNK DRIVER CRISIS?-WAsH. REV. CODE § 46.61.515 (1979).
In 1979 the Washington Legislature amended the drunk driver statute
to prescribe a minimum mandatory one-day jail sentence. ' This sanction
is an inappropriate response to the existing crisis of intoxicated drivers on
state roads and highways. It is unlikely that the mandatory jail term will
be more than marginally effective as a deterrent to drunk driving; this
sanction has not previously proven effective as a deterrent for the offense
of driving while intoxicated (DWI).2 Moreover, the amended statute is
likely to create substantial practical problems. By restricting the flexibif-
ity of the criminal justice system and increasing the likelihood that
offenders will decide to go to trial, the mandatory jail sanction will aggra-
vate the present problem of overloaded court dockets. 3 The new provision
will place an additional burden on overcrowded jail facilities. 4 Further,
the amended statute limits judicial discretion in sentencing, thus preclud-
ing the imposition of penalties that could be more appropriately tailored
to individual offenders. 5 Finally, many experts believe that a substantial
proportion of DWI offenders are alcoholics, 6 who need to be treated, not
I. The legislature enacted Sub. H.B. 665 which relates to various aspects of motor vehicle of-
fenses involving alcohol and drugs. 1979 Wash. Laws, ch. 176. Sub. H.B. 665 was signed into law
by the Governor on May 14, 1979. The mandatory imprisonment provisions went into effect on
January 1, 1980. The relevant provisions have been codified in R.C.W. §§ 46.61.502, .504, .506,
.515 (1979). See note 33 infra.
2. See notes 46-48 and 60-64 and accompanying text infra. As used in this comment, "drunk
driving" is the generic term for the actions of those who drive after drinking sufficient quantities of
alcohol to significantly impair their ability to drive. Driving while intoxicated (DWI) is used to de-
note the activity proscribed by statute. WAsH. REV. CODE § 46.61.502 (1979).
3. See notes 76-84 and accompanying text infra (discussion of the anticipated problems of an
increased number of contested trials and overloaded court dockets). See notes 85-92 and accompany-
ing text infra (discussion of the expected effect on plea bargaining).
4. See notes 83-95 and accompanying text infra.
5. See notes 97-109 and accompanying text infra.
6. U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., 1968 ALCOHOL AND HIGHWAY SAFETY REPORT 1 (for the H. Comm. on
Public Works, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 1968) [hereinafter cited as ALCOHOL AND HIGHWAY SAFETY RE-
PORT]. The Department of Health, Education and Welfare observed that "37 percent of DWI arrestees
were identified as alcoholics and 48 percent were identified as persons with serious drinking problems
[based on multiple criteria]." U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, ALCOHOL AND HEALTH 61
(1978) [hereinafter cited as ALCOHOL AND HEALTH]. Some experts have gone further. "[I]n the three
years in which I did many DWI examinations. . . .I could find no respondent who was definitely
not an alcoholic." C. BRIDGE, ALCOHOLISM AND DRIVING 6 (1972). The King County Prosecutor's Of-
fice estimates that as many as 70% of those arrested for DWI in King County are alcoholics or prob-
lem drinkers. Interview with Douglas Whalley, Senior Deputy Prosecutor, King County Prosecutor's
Office, in Seattle, Washington (Nov. 6, 1979) (notes of all interviews cited in this note are on file
with Washington Law Review). See THE PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENTAND ADMINISTRATION
OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: DRUNKENNESS 37-39 (1967)(studies of the relationship between al-
coholics and drunk driving).
As used in this note, an "alcoholic" is one "who habitually lacks self-control as to the use of
alcoholic beverages . . . to the extent that his health is substantially impaired ... or his social or
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imprisoned. 7 A DWI conviction provides an excellent opportunity to en-
courage problem drinkers to seek treatment. Yet the present statute arbi-
trarily requires imprisonment of such offenders rather than early, compre-
hensive treatment. This note critically examines the mandatory
imprisonment statute and proposes a more effective solution to the drunk
driver crisis.
I. THE NATURE AND SCOPE OF THE CRISIS
Alcohol is the major cause of many highway accidents and fatalities.
Half of the fifty thousand deaths on the nation's roadways each year in-
volve drivers affected by alcohol. 9 The total annual economic cost of al-
cohol-related traffic accidents exceeds five billion dollars.' 0 In 1979 in
Washington, a record 1,004 highway deaths were reported. Over half of
these accidents involved drivers affected by alcohol. 12
economic function is substantially disrupted." WASH. REV. CODE § 70.96A.020(l) (1979). Alcohol-
ism is the disease of "addiction to alcohol." ALCOHOL AND HEALTH, supra at 7. "Problem drinker,"
as used herein, is one who manifests alcohol-related disabilities, but who is not necessarily an al-
coholic. Id. at 8.
7. NATIONAL COMM. ON UNIFORM TRAFFIC LAWS AND ORDINANCES, TRAFFIC LAWS ANNOTATED 644-45
(1972) [hereinafter cited as TRAFFIC LAWS ANNOTATED]. The United States Supreme Court stated in
Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968), that imprisonment is not an effective way of dealing with
alcoholism, "one of our principal social and public health problems." Id. at 526-27 (footnote omit-
ted). Justice Fortas reasoned that since alcoholism is a disease, it could not be cured or even improved
by imprisonment. Id. at 566-67 (dissenting opinion). See generally Blinder & Komblum, The Al-
coholic Driver: A Proposalfor Treatment as an Alternative to Punishment, 56 JUDICATURE 24 (1972).
8. Waller, Drinking and Highway Safety, in DRINKING 117-36 (J. Ewing & B. Rouse ed. 1978).
"Alcohol is the single most important factor yet identified in traffic fatalities." Id. at 117.
9. "[AJlcohol has been found to be the largest single factor leading to fatal crashes." ALCOHOL
AND HIGHWAY SAFETY REPORT, supra note 6, at 11 (emphasis in original). The General Accounting
Office reported last year that "alcohol-related accidents now account for as much as one-half of all
highway deaths [about 25,000 persons annually]." COMPTROLLER GENERAL'S REPORTTOTHE CONGRESS,
THE DRINKING-DRIVER PROBLEM-WHAT CAN BE DONE ABOUT IT? 1 (1979) [hereinafter cited as DRINK-
ING-DRIVER REPORT].
An American Medical Association (AMA) Committee reported, moreover, that "official statistics
... grossly underestimate the effect of alcohol in road accidents even when indicating that [up to) 50
percent of casualties in particular classes of accidents can be traced to the effects of alcohol ......
AMERICAN MEDICAL Ass'N COMM. ON MEDICO-LEGAL PROBLEMS, ALCOHOL AND THE IMPAIRED DRIVER 2
(1968)[hereinafter cited as AMA REPORT].
10. DRINKING-DRIVER REPORT, supra note 9, at 1-2.
11. Records Section, Washington State Patrol, Toxologist Results of Drivers Killed in Fatal Ac-
cidents (computer printout on file with Washington Law Review).
12. 53.5% of all drivers killed on Washington highways in 1978 had a blood alcohol content
(BAC) of 0.10% or higher. Id.
Many experts believe that the alcoholic and other problem drinkers, who make up only a small
minority of the driving population, are responsible for a large proportion of the overall problem.
DRINKING-DRIVER REPORT, supra note 9, at 1. See the studies collected in THE PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON
LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: DRUNKENNESS 38-39 (1967).
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Alcohol has a predictable, progressive, deleterious effect on essential
driving skills. Continued drinking impairs integrated reasoning and judg-
ment, then motor processes, then memory and rational behavior.13 The
risk of a traffic accident increases geometrically as the driver's blood al-
cohol content (BAC) increases. 14 Likewise, the seriousness of the result-
ing accident tends to increase as the BAC increases. 15
The problem of responding to the drunk driver phenomenon has been
left largely to the criminal justice system. 16 Apprehending, convicting,
and sentencing the DWI offender depletes a large proportion of state
"Five million Americans, five percent of the adult population, are alcoholics. The majority of them
drive." Blinder & Komblum, supra note 7, at 24.
Even Where alcoholism is not directly implicated, heavy drinkers account for a grossly dispropor-
tionate share of accidents and fatalities. "[O]ne to four percent of drivers on the road-those with
blood alcohol concentrations at or above 100 mg per 100 ml (0.10% by wt)-are accounting for
about 50-55 percent of all single vehicle crashes in which drivers are fatally injured." ALCOHOL AND
HIGHWAY SAFETY REPORT, supra note 6, at 13 (emphasis in original). Some studies have shown that 48
to 57% of drivers involved in fatal accidents had "very high concentrations" of alcohol in their
blood. DRINKING-DRIvER REPORT, supra note 9, at 1. See generally NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY
ADMINISTRATION, ALCOHOL SAFETY COUNTERMEASURES PROGRAM 2-9 (1971) [hereinafter cited as COUN-
TERMEASURES PROGRAM].
13. AMA REPORT, supra note 9, at 27-35 (discussion of the effect of alcohol on the nervous
system and on driving ability).
14. "[T]he relative probabilities of crash involvement and causation increase dramatically as the
driver's BAC increases." ALCOHOL AND HEALTH, supra note 6, at 61-62. See ALCOHOL AND HIGHWAY
SAFETY REPORT, supra note 6, at 29. Driving skills deteriorate at even low BAG levels (less than
0.05%). As the concentration increases, the relative probability of a crash increases dramatically. "A
person with a .15 percent (BAG), is 25 times more likely to have a collision than an abstainer."
COUNTERMEASURES PROGRAM, supra note 12, at 3-4 (emphasis in original).
Drivers with very high BACs, of course, often avoid accidents and detection by driving extra
carefully. Such circumspect drinking drivers, while not particularly dangerous in normal driving situ-
ations, are nonetheless impaired when reacting to an emergency situation. C. BRIDGE, supra note 6, at
40-41.
15. ALCOHOL AND HIGHWAY SAFETY REPORT, supra note 6, at 31-32, 54-57. See AMA REPORT,
supra note 9, at 35-49 (studies of the effect of alcohol on driving ability).
Drivers arrested for DWI are likely to be seriously intoxicated. "Among drivers arrested for
drunken driving, blood alcohol concentrations at and in excess of [0.15%] are the rule, and substan-
tially over half exceed [0.20%]. Concentrations in this remarkably high range are extremely rare
among drivers using the roads." ALCOHOL AND HIGHWAY SAFETY REPORT, supra note 6, at 17. But see
Little, Statistical Relationship Between Presumptive Blood Alcohol Concentrations Limits of Ille-
gality and Measured BAG's of Drunk Drivers, 63 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 278, 281, 283-84 (1972)
(indicating somewhat lower proportions).
A level of 0.20% is twice the generally recognized statutory presumption for intoxication. TRAmc
LAws ANNOTATED, supra note 7, at 607-08.
To reach a BAC of even 0.10% would require a substantial consumption of alcohol. Although
blood alcohol levels depend upon various factors, including body weight, amount and type of food in
the stomach, and time between drinking and testing, the primary factor is the amount of alcohol
ingested. For example, to attain a BAC of 0.10% two hours after eating, a 160-pound person would
have to imbibe seven one-ounce drinks of 86-proof whiskey in one hour. COUTRMEASURES PROGRAM,
supra note 12, at 4.




criminal justice resources. 17 The total cost to state and local government
exceeds five hundred million dollars each year. 18 Arrests for DWI,
moreover, have increased dramatically over the past decade. 19 In many
jurisdictions, DWI prosecutions are more numerous than prosecutions for
any other offense. 20
The Department of Transportation described this situation as a "crisis
demanding a prompt and effective remedy.' '21 Prodded by similar de-
mands of the state electorate, 22 the Washington State Legislature was in a
position last year to take strong action to confront this problem.
II. LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE
Given the magnitude of the drinking-driver crisis, the Washington Leg-
islature reacted with restraint. 23 No increase was made in the schedule of
fines, which had been in effect since 1965.24 There was no significant
change in the provisions governing suspension and revocation of the
offender's driver's license. 25 Many of the minimum terms of imprison-
ment were reduced: the minimum jail term was reduced from five days to
one day for a first offense, and from thirty days to seven days for a subse-
quent offense within five years. 26 In only one major respect were the pen-
alties made more severe. In response to the tendency of judges to refrain
from sending DWI offenders to jail, especially for a first offense, the leg-
islature specified that "the jail sentence shall not be suspended or de-
17. See DRINKING-DRIVER REPORT, supra note 9, at 38-40.
18. Hornaday, Sentencing the Drinking Driver in Alaska: The Homer Alternate Work Program,
7 U.C.L.A.-ALASKA L. REV. 235, 235 (1978).
19. Assuming arrest figures are a reliable guide, the incidence of DWI increased 84.8% between
1969 and 1978. U.S. DEP'TOF JUSTICE, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES- 1978 at 188 (1979).
20. "Driving under the influence" is now the single most frequent criminal offense (second
only to "all other offenses") reported in the FBI Uniform Crime Report. Id. at 186. An estimated
1,268,700 arrests for DWI were made in the U.S. in 1978. Id.
21. NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMINISTRATION, ALCOHOL HIGHWAY-TRAFFIC SAFETY
WORKSHOP FOR THE JUDICIARY I- 1 (1974).
22. See Letter from State Representative Rod Chandler to author, at 1 (Oct. 13. 1979) (on file
with Washington Law Review).
23. See note I supra.
24. Compare 1979 Wash. Laws, ch. 176, § 6, at 1483-84 (codified at R.C.W. § 46.61.515
(1979)), with 1977 Wash. Laws, ch. 3, § 3, at 174-75 and 1965 Wash. Laws, ch. 155, § 62. at
2313-14. See WASH. REV. CODE §§ 46.61.515(1), (2) (1979).
25. It remains "not less than thirty days" for a first conviction, "not less than sixty days" for a
second conviction within five years and "revoked" for a third conviction within five years. WASH.
REV. CODE § 46.61.515(5) (1979).
26. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 46.61.515(1), (2) (1979). These provisions are encouraging, as they
demonstrate the legislature's concern with both the overcrowding and adverse effects of jail. See
notes 76-84 and 93-95 and accompanying text infra.
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ferred." 27 This directive is modified by the proviso: "unless the judge
finds that the imposition of the jail sentence will pose a risk to the defen-
dant's physical or mental well-being." 28
There were two other notable changes. First, the amended statute
adopts a per se test for intoxication based on a BAC of 0.10 percent.2 9
Second, the amended statute provides for mandatory alcohol-abuse edu-
cation. 30 Upon a first conviction for DWI, the offender is obligated to
"complete a course at an [approved] alcohol information school.' '31 For
a subsequent offense within five years, the statute directs the judge to
sentence the offender to an additional jail term of not more than 180 days,
to be suspended unconditionally upon non-repetition, alcohol treatment,
or other appropriate conditions. 32
The legislative history behind the statute is scanty. 33 There has been a
judicially observed policy in Yakima, Washington to impose a minimum
mandatory two-day jail term for DWI offenses. 34 The proponents of the
legislation sought to extend that policy statewide, 35 even though the de-
terrent results in Yakima had proven inconclusive. The Yakima experi-
27. WASH. REv. CODE § 46.61.515(1) (1979).
28. Id. For a first conviction, a minimum of one day must be served. For each subsequent con-
viction within five years, the entire sentence must be served. All mandatory sentences are subject to
the "physical and mental well-being" exception. Id. at §§ 46.61.515(1), (2).
29. R.C.W. 99 46.61.502, .504, .506 (1979) were amended so that any driver with a BAC of
0.10% or higher would be found guilty of DWI per se.
The per se test raises an interesting constitutional question. The United States Supreme Court has
held that irrebutable presumptions require an extremely close nexus between the basic fact (0.10%
BAC) and the presumed fact (intoxication), approaching certainty, in order to satisfy due process.
Finding an irrebutable presumption from the basic fact violates due process if the presumed fact "is
not necessarily or universally true in fact." Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 452 (1973). See Com-
ment, The Irrebutable Presumption Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 87 HARV. L. REv. 1534 (1974).
Of course, the presumption of intoxication from a BAC reading exceeding 0.10% is increasingly
accepted and based on strong, scientific grounds. Comment, Breath Alcohol Analysis: Can it With-
stand Modern Scientific Scrutiny?, 5 N. Ky. L. REv. 207, 214 (1978). See note 41 infra. This note
focuses on the penalty provisions of the new law and does not discuss this constitutional question
further.
30. WASH. REv. CODE §9 46.61.515(1), (2) (1979). See Letter from Chandler, supra note 22, at
1-2.
31. WASH. REv. CODE § 46.61.515(1) (1979). The course content is not defined. It must be "ap-
proved by the department of social and health services." Id.
32. Id. at§46.61.515(2).
33. The original H.B. 665 was introduced by State Representatives Chandler, Thompson, Ros-
bach, Heck, Teutsch, Sherman, Haley, Newhouse, and Fuller on Jan. 29, 1979. See WASHINGTON
LEoisLAnvE DiOEsT AND HISTORY OF BiLs 693-94 (46th Sess. 1979). Interviews of those involved, in
addition to a file maintained by the Washington State Patrol (on file with Washington Law Review),
were the only way to determine the rationale behind the enactment.
34. Interview with K. R. St. Clair, Defense Attorney, in Mount Vernon, Washington (Dec. 13,
1979); interview with Jeffrey Sullivan, Deputy Prosecutor, Yakima County Prosecutor's Office (Feb.
13, 1980).
35. Id.
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ence, moreover, has demonstrated that mandatory sentencing has adverse
effects on the criminal justice machinery, especially in terms of over-
loaded court dockets. 36
Sponsors of the legislation articulated three goals in enacting this stat-
ute. First, the statute should provide a strong deterrent sanction for those
prone to drink and drive; second, it should operate to increase the likeli-
hood of convicting drinking drivers; and third, it should provide for iden-
tification and treatment of alcoholic drivers. 37
The first goal was to be attained by implementing the mandatory jail
scheme, described by its proponents as a "positive and meaningful deter-
rent. '"38 Although little evidence was available to support the argument
that such a sanction would be effective, the prevailing attitude among
legislators was that it was "well worth a try." 39 The legislature sought to
effect the second goal by redefining the offense of DWI to consist of driv-
ing with a BAC of 0.10 percent or higher. This per se measure was ap-
pealing both because of the ease with which blood alcohol levels are mea-
sured and because of the close connection between BAC, intoxication,
and impaired driving. 40 Such a law has been enacted in twelve other
states41 and many foreign jurisdictions 42 and is part of the Uniform Vehi-
36. Interviews with Staff Attorneys at the Yakima County Prosecutor's Office (Dec. 14, 1979).
Although there is no statistical evidence available, those senior officials in charge of the
DWI-control program believe there is a positive trend developing in alcohol-related accidents and
deaths in Yakima. They believe that the stiff two-day mandatory jail sentence, combined with a great
emphasis on changing public attitudes (radio advertising, billboards, posters, a speaker program, and
other publicity), has significantly reduced the drunk driver problem in Yakima County. At the same
time, they admit there has been a "noticeable increase" in contested trials, jury trials, and appeals.
Interview with Michael W. Lynch and Jeffrey Sullivan, Deputy Prosecutors, Yakima County Prose-
cutor's Office (Feb. 13, 1980). Mr. Sullivan testified during the legislature's hearings on the bill.
relating both the positive and negative experiences with the sanction. Id.
37. See Letter from Chandler, supra note 22, at 1-2; interview with State Representative Delores
Teutsch, in Seattle, Washington (Oct. 29, 1979).
38. Letter from Captain G. B. Tellevik, Criminal Justice Services, Washington State Patrol, to
author (Oct. 29, 1979) (on file with Washington Law Review).
39. Interview with Teutsch, supra note 37; Letter from Chandler, supra note 22, at 2.
40. See note 29 supra and notes 41-43 infra.
41. Per se intoxication statutes have been enacted in the following States:' Delaware, DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 11, § 3505 (1979); Florida, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 322.262(2)(c) (West 1975); Minnesota,
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 169.121 (1)(d) (West Supp. 1979); Missouri, Mo. ANN. STAT. § 577.012(0) (Ver-
non 1979); Nebraska, NEB. REV. STAT. § 39-669.07 (1978); New Hampshire, N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 262-A:63 (1977); New York, N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1192(2) (McKinney 1976); North Caro-
lina, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-138(b) (1978); Oregon, OR. REV. STAT. § 487.540(1)(a) (1977); South
Dakota, S.D. CONIPILEDLAWSANN. § 32-23-1(1) (1976); Utah, UTAHCODEANN. § 41-6-44.2 (Supp.
1979); Vermont, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 23 § 1201 (a) (1978). See E. FISHER & R. REEDER, VEHICLE TRAF-
FIc LAW 176 (1974); E. KEARNEY, DIFFERENcES AlONo TRAFFIc LAWS IN THE UNITED STATES I I (reprint of
7 TRAFFic LAWS COMMENTARY No. 3 (1978)) (discussions of the per se intoxication laws).
42. E.g., West Germany, § 24a STVG (1974). See H. PREISENDANZ, STRAFGESErZBUCH 810-14
(1975).
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cle Code. 43 To achieve the third goal, the treatment of alcoholic drivers,
the legislature modified the process by which the drinking driver is re-
ferred to alcohol abuse training after the first offense and encouraged to
obtain treatment following subsequent offenses.44 There is reason to be-
lieve, however, that these new DWI provisions, especially mandatory jail
terms, will not prove more than marginally effective in achieving these
goals.
III. ANTICIPATED DETERRENT RESULTS
Deterring specified antisocial conduct is the fundamental purpose of
any criminal statute. 45 Unless the prospect of serving a mandatory, albeit
brief, jail term acts to alter the antisocial conduct of the potential DWI-
one who drives after heavy drinking-no advantage will accrue from the
existence of the deterrent sanction. For the deterrent scheme to be effec-
tive, then, the potential drunk driver must be both aware of the existence
of the sanction and susceptible to its deterrent effect.
Mandatory jail sentences have rarely been used in the drinking-driver
context.46 The most fundamental reason, undoubtedly, is that such
schemes simply have not worked. 47 In the few jurisdictions where en-
See also Ross, The Scandinavian Myth: The Effectiveness of Drinking-and-Driving Legislation in
Sweden andNorway, 4 J. LEGALSTJDIEs 285,286-90 (1975) (discussion of the "world's first" per se
drinking and driving laws enacted in Scandinavia in the 1930's and 40's).
43. UNiroRM VEHICLE CODE § 11-902(a). See TRamc LAWS ANNOTATED, supra note 7, at 607-08
(discussion of per se laws).
44. R.C.W. §§ 46.61.515(1) and (2) provide that every first-time offender attend an approved
"alcohol information school" while second offenders may participate in a more intensive treatment
program in lieu of 180-day maximum period of imprisonment. WAsH. REV. CODE §§ 46.61.515(1),
(2) (1979). These are clearly steps in the right direction. This note maintains, however, that diagnosis
and treatment should commence after the first offense. See Little, Challenges to Humanitarian Legal
Approachesfor Eliminating the Hazards of Drunk Alcoholic Drivers, 4 GA. L. REv. 251 (1970).
On the other hand, some experts believe that a first DWI conviction is a relatively poor indicator of
alcoholism compared to a second conviction. Interview with Robert F. Franzen, Head Alcohol Abuse
Counselor, Burlington Northern Railroad, in Bellevue, Washington (Jan. 16, 1980). But a first con-
viction for DWI does indicate that a primary diagnosis is in order. Id.
45. W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTT, CRIMINAL LAW § 5, at 21-25 (1972). See J. LITTLE, supra note 16, at
192-96.
46. Prior to Washington, North Carolina was the only state to have a mandatory jail sentence for
DWI. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-179(a) (1978). (First offenders, for example, were subject to a fine and
a minimum thirty-day sentence.) The Idaho Supreme Court struck down a similar statute as an uncon-
stitutional limitation on judicial discretion in State v. McCoy, 94 Idaho 236, 486 P.2d 247 (1971)
(Idaho law mandated a minimum ten-day sentence). 1970 Idaho Sess. Laws, ch. 264, § 2, at 701. See
note 48 infra (discussion of mandatory jail sentences for DWI).
47. See note 48 infra. "[P]assing laws is not an effective approach if public opinion does not
support the law.... [One study revealed that] the harshness of the penalty per se did not appear to be
associated with the effectiveness of the sentence." Waller, supra note 8, at 13 1-32. See Note, Deter-
ring the Drinking Driver: Treatment vs. Punishment, 7 U.C.L.A.-AtASKA L. REv. 244, 251-53
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acted, mandatory jail sentences have reduced neither the number of
deaths nor the destruction caused by drunk drivers. 48 There are at least
three other reasons which might explain why such sanctions have not of-
ten been enacted. First, the trial judge can impose a tailored sentence
more likely to deter the particular offender than a blanket sanction man-
dated by the legislature. 49 Second, heavy drinkers do not always weigh
the consequences of their actions intelligently, especially after drinking. 50
Third, there are other deterrent measures available which are more effec-
tive and less counterproductive. 51
In amending the drunk driver statute, the Washington Legislature was
concerned with the unwillingness of trial judges to impose jail sentences
on DWI offenders. 52 The proponents argued that if the decision to impose
this penalty was removed from the province of the judiciary and made
mandatory statewide, the deterrent effect of the sanction would in-
crease. 53 Once aware of the serious consequences, the drinker would
think twice before driving.
(1978), and sources cited therein. See generally Little, A Theory and Empirical Study of What Deters
Drinking Drivers, If, When and Why!, Pa.tII, 23 ADMIN. L. REv. 169 (1971).
48. Sweden, Denmark, Finland, and Norway have had the combination of the per se conviction
and mandatory prison sentences for over four decades. Ross, supra note 42, at 288-90. The manda-
tory minimum sentence in Norway is 21 days. Id. at 288. Yet despite the widespread belief that such
an approach works, the "Scandinavian Myth," there is no evidence that these laws have had any
substantial effect on the drinking-driver problem. Id. at 285-86.
See generally Little, supra note 47; Ross & Blumenthal, Sanctions for the Drinking Driver; An
Experimental Study, 3 J. LEGAL STUDIES 53 (1974) (discussions of the deterrent effect of other sanc-
tions). See also Little, supra note 47, at 179; Robertson, Rich, & Ross, Jail Sentences for Driving
While Intoxicated in Chicago: A Judicial Policy that Failed, 8 LAW & Soc. REV. 55, 64 (1973):
Strimbeck, Driving While Intoxicated Should Not Be Treated as a Criminal Matter, 16 N.H.B.J. 214
(1974); Waller, supra note 8, at 131-32.
49. AMERICAN BAR Ass'N PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, SENTENCING ALTER-
NATIVES AND PROCEDURES 1-4 (1968). Cf. D. THOMAS, PRINCIPLES OF SENTENCING 6-14 (1979) (English
view toward sentencing principles).
50. For example, even though most DWI convictions today result in suspension of the offender's
driver's license, with a concomitant jail sentence if the offender is subsequently caught driving, a
significant proportion of problem drinkers continue to drive while their licenses are suspended. NA-
TIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMINISTRATION, supra note 21, at 11-73. See ALCOHOL AND HIGHWAY
SAFETY REPORT, supra note 6, at 56.
The problem is of particular concern with alcoholic drivers: "80 percent of [alcoholic] drivers
.under suspension' are still on the road driving .... [B]ecause of their deterioration [alcoholics] are
very impulsive, so that it is a very common thing for an alcoholic while drunk to care for nothing, say
'To hell with it,' and take the car out." C. BRIDGE, supra note 6, at 71. See notes 60-64 and accom-
panying text infra.
51. See notes 105-115 and accompanying text infra.
52. Interview with Teutsch, supra note 37; interview with Whalley, supra note 6; see interview
with District Court Judge Filis Otto, Pierce County District Court, in Seattle (Oct. 19, 1979).
53. Letter from Chandler, supra note 22; interview with Teutsch, supra note 37; letter from
Tellevik, supra note 38.
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In spite of its enticing simplicity, this argument is inadequate. It over-
looks the key role judges play in punishing criminal activity while trying
to rehabilitate the offender. Judges are generally as concerned with the
DWI crisis as are legislators. 54 But judges are also, through training and
experience, more aware than the legislature of the limitations and disad-
vantages of all types of criminal sanctions. 55 Judges know that jail sen-
tences, mandatory or not, are not nece.ssarily effective deterrents. 56
The argument also overlooks an inherent advantage judges have over
legislators. Judges may hold the threat of a jail sentence over the offender
to encourage-in effect, to coerce-him or her to take remedial action to
correct the underlying problem. By the time the DWI offender stands be-
fore the judge, primary deterrence has failed. The judge is then properly
concerned with dealing with the person's individual problems and seek-
ing to deter his or her future criminal conduct. 57 Flexibility is essential to
mold a just and effective response. 58 By handcuffing the judiciary to a
minimum sentence scheme, the legislature has largely negated this impor-
tant advantage. 59
A mandatory sanction, moreover, is likely to deter only the responsible
drinker who does not pose a serious problem, rather than the problem
drinker or alcoholic. 60 Ingestion of enough alcohol to adversely affect
54. See Ringold, A Judge's Personal Perspective on Criminal Sentencing, 51 WASH. L. REV.
631, 631, 635 (1976). See generally NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFmC SAFETY ADMINISTRATION, supra note
16, at 11-8, 11- 11 to 11- 12.
55, Ringold, supra note 54, at 631-32, 640-41. See AMERICAN BAR ASS'N PROJECT, supra note
49, at 1-4.
56. AMERICAN BAR ASS'N PROJECr, supra note 49, at 1-12. See also G. NEWMAN, THE PUNISHMENT
RESPONSE 229-30 (1978).
57. Ringold, supra note 54, at 635-39.
58. "According to the highly respected [Chief Judge] David Bazelon.... the very essence of the
ideal of justice is to permit judges to apply individualized justice to offenders." CRIME AND PUNISH-
MENTIN AMERICA 182 (J. Bunchered. 1978)(footnote omitted).
59. One disturbing aspect of the amended DWI statute is its reflection of the legislature's disen-
chantment with the way judges are performing the critical task of sentencing. It may even presage a
view that the legislature considers itself better able to mandate sentences for other offenses.
Concern has been expressed regarding the arbitrary sentencing procedures mandated in other
legislation. Interview with District Court Judge Otto, supra note 52. See WASH. REv. CODE §§
13.40.010-.400 (1979)(Juvenile Justice Act of 1977).
"Mhe legislature should not specify in advance sentences which must be imposed regardless of
the circumstances of the offense." AMERICAN BAR ASS'N PROJECT, supra note 49, at 55. See the discus-
sion of the justification for judicial discretion in sentencing in N. MORRIS, THE FUTURE OF IMPRISON-
MENT 30-31 (1974) and A. VON HIRSCH. DOING JUSTICE, ch. 12 (1976), especially the discussion of
mandatory sentencing standards. Id. at 102-04.
60. "[C]hronic alcoholics lack the requisite control over their drinking practices to be deterred
by threats that presume a capacity for rational deliberation concerning alternative courses of action."
Little, supra note 44, at 252. See C. BRIDGE, supra note 6, at 71-72. See also note 48 supra.
On the other hand, a low level of alcohol consumption typical of the non-DWI drinker will neither
raise his BAC to a significantly high level nor markedly affect his ability to drive. COUNTERMEASURES
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one's ability to drive will adversely affect judgment as well. Beyond the
point of intoxication, the drinker loses much of his or her ability to ration-
ally deliberate alternate courses of action. 61 At that point, the existence of
potential criminal sanctions is unlikely to compel a decision not to drive
while drunk, particularly where the perceived possibility of getting
caught is low. 62 That the threat of a mandatory jail sentence is unlikely to
affect the choice is evidenced by the large number of DWI offenders,
estimated to be as high as eighty percent, 63 who continue to drive after
having their licenses suspended or revoked, despite the threat of heavy
jail sentences for such a violation. 64
A more effective deterrent measure, missing from the present legisla-
tion, is increased police capacity to detect drunk drivers on the high-
way. 65 Increased police presence during late night hours, particularly in
areas of high incidence of DWI offenses, is effective because the per-
ceived possibiliy of arrest is markedly increased. 66 Any such measure, of
course, requires legislative action to provide the substantial additional
funds and manpower needed.
The amended DWI statute also fails to provide for a means to inform
the potential DWI offender of the new sanction or to educate the public of
the dangers of drinking and driving. 67 Imposing a strong punishment
PROGRAM, supra note 12, at 2-5. To the extent that responsible drinkers are sensitive to their societal
obligations, the mandatory jail sanction will deter them. But deterrence of responsible drinkers, who
represent little serious threat on the highway, will have little effect on the drunk driver crisis. Little.
Control of the Drinking Driver: Science Challenges Legal Creativity, 54 A.B.A.J. 555, 556-57
(1968). See NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMINISTRATION, supra note 21, at 11-34.
61. See notes 50 and 60 supra.
62. Note, Deterring the Drinking Driver: Treatment vs. Punishment 7 U.C.L.A.-ALASKA L.
REV. 244, 252-53 (1978). See Little, A Theory and Empirical Study of What Deters Drinking Driv-
ers, If, When and Why!, Part II, 23 ADMIN. L. REV. 169, 185-87 (1971) (probability of non-detec-
tion).
63. C. BRIDGE, supra note 6, at 71.
64. See note 50 supra. In Washington, "[ilf such person at the time of a second or subsequent
conviction [for DWI] is without a license . . . because of a previous suspension or revocation, the
minimum mandatory sentence shall be ninety days in jail .... The penalty so imposed shall not be
suspended or deferred." WASH. REV. CODE § 46.61.515(2) (1979). See also WASH. REV. CODE §
46.20.416 (1979) (penalties for driving while license is suspended or revoked).
Many states impose similar jail sentences for driving after a license has been suspended or revoked
due to a DWI conviction. TRAFFIC LAWS ANNOTATED, supra note 7, at 621-27.
65. DRINKING-DRIVER REPORT, supra note 9, at 13, 46-48. "A high probability of apprehension
combined with relatively moderate punishment is more effective than a low probability of apprehen-
sion combined with highly severe punishment .... " Waller, supra note 8, at 134.
66. DRINKING-DRIVER REPORT, supra note 9, at 22. In one study of drinking-driver emphasis pa-
trols, "alcohol involvement in fatal crashes was reduced from 63 percent in 1972 to 38 percent in
1976." Id.
67. "Educational efforts must include informing the public of the nature and extent of the prob-
lem." Waller, supra note 8, at 135. See COUNTERMEASURES PROGRAM, supra note 12, at 9-10 (need for
public education and support).
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without advising citizens that it will be used will achieve little. Before
any sanction will be effective, it is essential that public attitudes about
drinking and driving be dramatically changed. 68 Yet the legislature has
not earmarked funds for publicizing either the nature of the problem or
the mandatory sanction, apparently relying upon the mass media and
word of mouth to inform the public of the new legislative approach to the
crisis .69
IV. PRACTICAL PROBLEMS WITH MANDATORY JAIL
TERMS
Traditionally, most convictions for traffic offenses involving alcohol
have not resulted in jail terms. Fines, loss of driving privileges, legal
costs, higher insurance premiums, and other direct and indirect sanctions
have been adopted instead. 70 Where jail sentences were prescribed for the
crime of DWI or the lesser included offense of being in "actual physical
control of a vehicle while intoxicated,"71 the sentences were usually sus-
pended. 72 Even those twice convicted of DWI have often escaped impris-
onment. 7
3
68. Social acceptance of the drinking-driver is a major obstacle to successful deterrence. "[T]he
public's indifferent attitude or lack of commitment to the drinking-driver problem is an impediment
to its solution. Most people believe that drinking and driving is unacceptable only when it results in
an accident .... [The public looks upon convicted drinking-drivers] as otherwise law abiding citi-
zens who unfortunately got caught .... " DRINKING-DRIVER REPORT, supra note 9, at 36.
69. To be successful in reducing the number of drunk drivers, there must be a marked change in
attitude on the part of the drinking public. Id. at 35-37. In Yakima, any success in deterrence has
been primarily due to the emphasis given to publicizing the problem of drunk drivers as a major threat
to the community. Interview with Lynch and Sullivan, supra note 36.
In contrast to the extensive radio advertising, billboards, and other publicity used in Yakima, word
of mouth is the primary means by which the present statutory sanction is expected to be publicized.
The Senior Deputy Prosecutor in King County expects little public awareness of the mandatory sen-
tence for a period of six months to a year, until drinking-drivers hear of a neighbor or friend going to
jail for DWI. Interview with Whalley, supra note 6. Newspapers can also be expected to give notice
of the new sanction, at least to those persons who read the editorial pages. E.g., Seattle Times, Jan.
4, 1980, at AI2, col. 1.
70. 1 R. ERWIN, DEFENSEOF DRUNK DRIVING CASES iii-iv (3d ed. 1977).
71. "'Actual physical control' of a vehicle implies the present physical ability of one in a posi-
tion to control it .. " E. FISHER & R. REEDER, VEHICLE TRAFFIC LAW 174 (1974). For example, one
found asleep in his or her car, with head and arms resting on the steering wheel, while the motor is
running is in actual physical control of the vehicle. Id.
Prior to the 1979 amendments to the drunk driver statute, DWI and "actual physical control" were
treated differently with regard to senteficing. Under the present statute, they are identical in all re-
spects. See WASH. REV. CODE §§ 46.61.502, .504, .506, .515 (1979).
72. Interview with St. Clair, supra note 34.
73. Id. Interview with Whalley, supra note 6.
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Under the statute as now amended, judges have only limited discretion
to suspend or defer the jail sentence. 74 Because of the per se test for intox-
ication and the mandatory minimum sentence, judges will in most cases
have no choice but to convict and sentence offenders to jail. Although
there are ways to circumvent the statute, 75 the mandatory jail provision
will undoubtedly result in practical problems as DWI offenders seek to
avoid jail.
A. Increased Number of Contested Trials and the Resultant
Overloading of Criminal Court Dockets
The first and most serious problem associated with the mandatory sen-
tence is the potential overloading of the criminal justice system. The man-
datory jail sanction is likely to lead to highly congested court dockets
74. To suspend or defer the sentence, there must be a finding that the jail sentence will risk the
defendant's "physical or mental well-being." WASH. REV. CODE §§ 46.61.515(1), (2) (1979). See
note 75 infra (problems in obtaining such a finding).
75. There are three predictable ways in which a DWI offender may avoid imprisonment, in addi-
tion to plea bargaining and winning on the merits. First, persons stopped for DWI may not be cited
for that offense. The police officer, aware of the mandatory jail sanction, might cite someone with a
BAC of 0.08%, 0.10%, or even higher for a lesser offense or none at all. Whether it is wise to replace
judicial discretion with the discretion of the officer in the field is questionable. See J. LiTrrLE, supra
note 16, at 191. This has not been a significant problem in the first two months of the operation of the
sanction. Some police officers, in fact, are now more willing to cite offenders for DWI, because of
the ease of proof under the per se intoxication rule. Interview with Douglas Whalley, Senior Deputy
Prosecutor, King County Prosecutor's Office, in Seattle, Washington (Feb. 11, 1980).
The second method of avoidance is built into the statute itself. Since few would argue that jail
improves one's "physical or mental well-being," WASH. REv. CODE §§ 46.61.515(1), (2) (1979),
one can easily visualize DWI defense specialists retaining a doctor or psychiatrist to examine each
defendant and prepare the necessary medical evaluation. In counties where the overcrowding of court
dockets or jails are particular problems, or where judges are not disposed to sentence offenders to jail,
such practices may become commonplace, and findings of harm to physical or mental well-being
routinely made. Interview with St. Clair, supra note 34. Insofar as the jail term would be replaced
with a sanction more appropriate to the circumstances of the case (e.g., treatment), the effect of the
loophole is salutary. But establishing a fact predicate for such a judicial finding is likely to be expen-
sive, and therefore not readily available to everyone. One district court judge indicated that she will
demand in-court expert testimony before reaching such a finding. Interview with Otto, supra note 52.
To require such expert testimony will dramatically increase costs to a defendant intent on avoiding
time in jail.
A third possibility is the "deferred prosecution" statute. WASH. REv. Coos §§ 10.05.010-.130
(1979). Under the terms of this statute, a prosecution may be deferred while the defendant is referred
to an alcohol treatment facility. Id. at § 10.05.030. If treatment is reported to be successful, charges
may be dropped. Id. at § 10.05.120. Note that it is the prosecution that is being deferred, not the
sentencing. The latter is proscribed by the amended statute. WASH. REv. COOS § 46.61.515(1) (1979).
This procedure is likely to become popular to avoid imprisonment for DWI. To the extent that the
offender has a bona fide alcohol problem and undergoes effective treatment under court supervision,
the goals of identification and treatment of problem drinkers are achieved. If past practice under the
statute is any guide, however, the procedural device will be used to circumvent the jail sanction with
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because of an increased number of contested trials, de novo jury trials,
and appeals. 76
This result is largely due to the increased amount at stake to the defend-
ant. Until fairly recently, the penalty for first-offense drunk driving was
likely to be a moderate fine. 77 Faced with minimal sanctions, DWI
offenders usually appeared pro se, admitted their guilt, and accepted the
sentence imposed by the judge. 78 Given the present mandatory jail sen-
tence in Washington, many more DWI defendants can be expected to join
the trend toward hiring counsel, defending on the merits, and appealing
convictions. 79 It is not difficult to predict the grave effect this trend will
have on the day-to-day operations of the criminal courts. 80 Most county
prosecutors view this threat of overcrowded court dockets with concern.
Criminal courts are already overflowing, 81 and DWI cases often consti-
tute the largest category of cases filed. 82 A much higher number of
contested trial proceedings may overwhelm the system. 83
B. Effects on Plea Bargaining
Before the amended drunk driver statute took effect, prosecutors in
DWI cases often accepted uncontested guilty pleas to lesser included of-
fenses. The 1979 amendments hamper this salutary84 practice in two
no assurances of long-term rehabilitation. The primary defect is the lack of an effective, systematic
follow-up to insure that the treatment program has been completed. Interview with Franzen, supra
note 44.
76. See note 79 infra. See also Walling, supra note 8, at 131 (regarding the tendency of DWI
offenders to opt for a de novo jury trial where the judge has imposed a jail sentence).
77. 1 R. ERWIN, DEFENSE OF DRUNK DRIVING CASES iii (3d ed. 1977).
78. Id. at iv.
79. The King County Prosecutor's Office, for example, foresees a great increase in the number
of not-guilty pleas, jury trials, de novo superior court trials, and appeals. Interview with Whalley,
supra note 6. Such has been the experience in Yakima, Washington, where two days of jail has been
a mandatory sanction for the past two years. See notes 34-36 supra. A "noticeable increase" has
been experienced in each of those categories, creating a significant strain on the system. Interview
with Lynch and Sullivan, supra note 36.
80. See note 88 and accompanying text infra.
81. DRINKING-DRvER REPORT, supra note 9, at 40.
82. See note 20 supra.
83. There is at present a backlog of over 12,000 criminal cases statewide. At the end of 1979,
there were 425 new DWI-related cases each month. Depending on the county, delays in obtaining
trial dates vary from three months to over a year. At present about 25% of the DWI cases decided at
trial are appealed. Presentation by St. Clair, Defense Attorney, Mount Vernon, Washington, at the
Washington Trial Lawyer Ass'n Seminar, in Seattle, Washington (Oct. 19, 1979). The incidence of
appeals of DWI convictions will undoubtedly increase, largely because of the mandatory imprison-
ment sanction. Id.
84. The United States Supreme Court has held that plea bargaining-the granting of concessions
to those willing to plead guilty-is consistent with the Constitution as well as the administrative and
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ways. First, the prospect of a large number of DWI trials, at least without
substantial relief in additional funding and personnel, may force the pros-
ecutor into an unacceptably weak plea bargaining position. Second, under
the prior DWI statute, "actual physical control" was the lesser included
offense to which defendants typically could plead in exchange for a lesser
sentence. 85 Under the new law, however, DWI and actual physical con-
trol have identical sentences.8 6 Assuming that provident guilty pleas are a
boon to the efficient and fair operation of the criminal justice system,8 7
they should be encouraged.8 8 But unless there is a quidpro quo available,
defense attorneys will advise their clients to submit their cause to the trier
of fact, placing the burden of proof on the prosecutor and, consequently,
tying up the courts. 89
Under the present DWI statute, there is little that the prosecutor can
offer a defendant to elicit a guilty plea. Faced with an overloaded court
docket, overcrowded jails, and an understaffed prosecutor's office, many
prosecutors or judges may be inclined to drop the more serious DWI
charge and substitute a less serious one, such as negligent driving. 90 Such
a measure circumvents and promotes disrespect for the law and frustrates
the intent of the legislature. 9 1 Moreover, it may fail to identify the
rehabilitative goals of the criminal justice system. Brady v. United States. 397 U.S. 742. 751-753
(1970).
[The state may] extend a benefit to a defendant who in turn extends a substantial benefit to the
State and who demonstrates by his plea that he is ready and willing to admit his crime and to
enter the correctional system in a frame of mind that affords hope for success in rehabilitation
over a shorter period of time than might otherwise be necessary.
Id. at 753. Washington has a detailed rule governing plea bargaining agreements. WASH. CR. R. 4.2.
85. See WASH. REV. CODE § 46.61.504 (1979). See also note 71 supra (discussion of "'actual
physical control").
86. WASH. REv. CODE §§ 46.61.502, .504, .515(l), (2) (1979).
87. See note 84 supra.
88. Historically, about 90% of all criminal defendants plead guilty, a statistical premise upon
which our present court system is based. The consequences to our system of even a small reduction of
guilty pleas, for example, from 90% to 80%, would be tremendous. It would double the demand for
prosecutorial and judicial manpower and facilities. Address by Chief Justice Warren Burger. Ameri-
can Bar Ass'n Annual Convention (Aug. 10, 1970), reported in N.Y. Times, Aug. I1, 1970. at 24.
col. 4.
89. 1 R. ERWIN, DEFENSEOF DRUNK DRIVING CASES §§ 3.02-3.03 (3d ed. 1977).
90. Interview with St. Clair, supra note 34. See WASH. REV. CooE § 46.61.525 (1979) (negligent
driving statute).
91. There are numerous discretionary devices-ranging from acquittal of the guilty to reduc-
tion of the charge-by which the judge, if that is his purpose, can frustrate the effect of a man-
datory sentence .... The only alternative in many instances is imposition of a sentence which
under the circumstances of the case is much too harsh. Neither emasculating the statute nor
acquiescing in an injustice is to be commended. Both effectively and understandably breed dis-
respect for the system.
AMERICAN BAR Ass'N PROJECT, supra note 49, at 55-56.
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offender as a problem drinker and defeat efforts to encourage alcoholic
drivers to participate in effective treatment programs. 92
C. Aggravation of Overcrowded County Jail Facilities
By creating a large number of new inmates, mandatory jail sentences
will place an additional strain on an already overcrowded jail system. 93
The legislature recognized this potential problem and called for a study of
the "impact" on county jail facilities in the amended statute. 94 But not
only is there a problem in the absolute number of offenders to be main-
tained, there is also a problem with the integration of DWI offenders with
those in jail on more serious charges. Many fear that the DWI offender
will be subjected to verbal and physical abuse by other inmates while in
jail, even if he or she only receives a one-day sentence. 95 Segregation of
DWI inmates from those jailed for other offenses would solve this prob-
lem, but would greatly increase the administrative burden and might re-
quire construction of new facilities.96
92. The proposal recommended in this comment would provide the prosecutor, judge, and de-
fense counsel with the necessary bargaining flexibility within the ambit of the DWI statute. See notes
116-118 and accompanying text infra.
93. Overcrowding in county jails is at present intolerable, partially as a result of jailing DWI
offenders. Eastside Journal-American (published in Bellevue, Washington), Apr. 8, 1980, at A2,
col. 5. More than 25 suicide attempts occurred in the King County jail in the first three months of
1980. Id. Although that jail has a capacity of 650, the jail population recently exceeded 1100 persons.
Seattle Times, Apr. 10, 1980, at A12, col. 1. King County Executive John Spellman called for
moving all DWI offenders out of the county jail to help relieve grossly overcrowded conditions. Id.
Some county prosecutors have adopted a practice of renting space in hotels or motels in which to
"imprison" those sentenced to jail under this statute, contending that there is insufficient space in
local facilities. Interview with St. Clair, supra note 34. It is estimated that King County will require a
complete new facility to cope with the dual problems of increasing numbers and segregation of regu-
lar and DWI inmates. Interview with Whalley, supra note 6.
94. The legislature was well aware of the potential adverse effects of the new sentencing provi-
sions on "county jail conditions and bed space, the cost impact of the provisions upon local and state
governments, and the existence of alternative facilities to which individuals sentenced under this
section may be committed." WASH. REv. CODE § 46.61.515(7) (1979). However, no additional funds
were provided beyond the $10,000 allocated to conduct the impact study itself. 1979 Wash. Laws,
ch. 176, § 9, at 1486.
95. The legislature's concern with the problems necessitating the segregation of inmates, includ-
ing the likelihood of verbal and physical abuse, was explained by State Representative Delores
Teutsch. She suggested that this problem may require a complete reevalution of the statute. Interview
with Teutsch, supra note 37.
96. See Seattle Times, Apr. 10, 1980, at A 12, col. 1 (costs of moving DWI offenders from jail to
alternative facilities).
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D. Limitation on Judicial Discretion
Mandatory minimum jail sentences restrict the judge's discretion to fit
the punishment to the offender and the offense. Judges naturally resent
any statute which restricts their discretion to modify sentences. The ju-
diciary guards the "inherent" common law power of judges to suspend
sentences. 97 In some states, the concern has reached constitutional di-
mensions. 98 While the constitutional question is beyond the scope of this
note, the practical argument which lies behind it is relevant.
Traditionally, the judge has had power to exercise discretion in sen-
tencing an offender. 99 This power was appropriately granted because of
the judge's knowledge and experience of human nature and the efficacy
of various sanctions, and the unique position he or she has to absorb all
facts involving the defendant and the prohibited act. 100 The sentencing
proceedings reflected societal confidence in the judge's determination of
how best to punish and rehabilitate the offender. 101
Judges realize that jail sentences carry with them various disadvantages
to all concerned. To the government, jail is expensive: the annual cost of
facilities, personnel, and administration is significant. 102 Society is bur-
dened by the removal of a potentially productive member for the duration
of the sentence. But the greatest disadvantage is that incarceration is re-
pugnant, and often psychologically harmful, to the individual impris-
oned. 103 Therefore, unless the deterrent or rehabilitative effects outweigh
the disadvantages to government, society, and the individual, judges are
loath to sentence DWI offenders to jail. 104 Retention of judicial discretion
maintains the advantages of allowing judges to engage in this balancing
process.
97. The inherent power of the court to suspend or defer sentences is discussed in Annot.. 73
A.L.R.3d 474 (1976). See note 58 supra (discussion of individualized justice).
98. Annot., supra note 97, at 503-04. Compare State v. McCoy, 94 Idaho 236, 486 P.2d 247
(1971) (statute requiring mandatory imprisonment for DWI held to be unconstitutional infringement
on the common law right of judges to suspend sentences) with In re Greene, 297 N.C. 305, 255
S.E.2d 142 (1979) (similar DWI statute held to be within the constitutional power of the legislature).
See note 46 supra (citing statutes).
99. "The single most pervasive principle arising from the totality of rules on sentencing is that
which affords wide latitude to the discretion of the trial judge." A. CAMPBELL, LAW OF SENTENCING 222
(1978).
100. See J. BURNS & J. MATTINA, SENTENCING 1-5 (1978); Ringold, supra note 54, at 638-41
(role of the trial judge in sentencing and factors to be considered).
101. J. BURNS & J. MATTINA, supra note 100, at 5, 45-48.
102. L. H. DE WOLF, CRIMEANDJUSTICEIN AMERICA 37-39 (1975).
103. Id. at 39-41. See R. GOLDFAR , JAILS: THE ULTIMATE GHETrO (1975). See generally R. CAR-
TER, D. GLASER, & L. WILKINS, CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTIONs 70-75 (2d. ed. 1977) (discussion of the
conditions which lead to the repugnant nature of imprisonment); J. SPRADLEY, YOU OWE YOURSELF A
DRUNK 193-224 (1970) (excellent study focusing on the jailing of drunks in Seattle).
104. AMERICAN BAR Ass'N COMM. ON THE TRAFFIC COURT PROGRAM, STANDARDS FOR TRAFFIC JUSTICE
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Mandatory imprisonment is not the answer to the present crisis. It has
not proven effective as a deterrent to drunk driving. 105 It brings with it
various countervailing considerations. 106 On balance, the disadvantages
of the sanction outweigh its marginal deterrent effect. With these defi-
ciencies in mind, the following alternative solution is proposed.
V. RECOMMENDED ALTERNATIVE
Any appropriate statutory response to the complex criminal phenome-
non of drunk driving must contain provisions which satisfy the three goals
identified by the legislature in enacting the present statute. 107 First, there
must be a spectrum of strong deterrent sanctions to impose on those who
break the law. Second, there must be a flexible, workable structure which
increases the likelihood of convicting those guilty of drunk driving, with
the least possible adverse effect on the criminal justice system. Third, the
statute must provide for early diagnosis and treatment of the problem
drinker.
A. Proposed Deterrent Sanctions
The primary emphasis of any criminal statute must be on deterring the
defined antisocial conduct. 108 A wide range of stiff and innovative sanc-
tions must be available for application by trial judges to punish those who
commit the offense. 109 The present statute focuses on mandatory jail sen-
tences. But while imprisonment should be retained as one of the available
8-10 (1975). See SENrraNCNG, supra note 100, at 5 (discussion of factors to be weighed in sentenc-
ing); notes 54-55 supra.
105. See notes 46-48 and 60-64 and accompanying text supra.
106. See notes 75-104 and accompanying text supra (practical problems with mandatory jail
terms).
107. See note 37 and accompanying text supra.
108. See note 45 supra.
109. These sanctions should include the traditional ones available under the present statute: jail
terms, stiff fines, and license suspensions and revocations. The judge should be granted great latitude
to impose a tailored set of these sanctions. The National Committee on Uniform Traffic Laws recom-
mends "harsh penalties" to deter persons who drive when they are drunk. The Committee maintains
that such penalties can be effective in deterring non-alcoholics. TRAFFIC LAWS ANNOTATED, supra note
7, at 621, 645. There is a significant group of persons who drive drunk even though they are not
problem drinkers, particularly teenagers just learning how to drive and just starting to drink. COUN-
mEAsornas PRoGRAM, supra note 12, at 5. While it is improper to punish for the status of alcoholic or
the disease of alcoholism, it is appropriate to punish affirmative, criminal actions committed while
under the influence of alcohol. Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 532 (1968).
The judge should, in addition, have other less conventional sanctions available. There are a num-
ber of innovative approaches which could be taken, including public service work requirements,
advising the press of persons arrested for or convicted of drunk driving, and alternate work programs
in lieu of imprisonment. See Hornaday, supra note 17. See generally Little, supra note 44.
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sanctions, even for a first offense, it should be imposed only when the
trial judge deems it appropriate under all the circumstances. 110
Additional deterrence should be achieved by markedly increasing the
fine schedule."' This is especially appropriate because fines for DWI
have not been increased since 1965.112 The statute should also permit the
judge to limit the offender's driving privileges short of outright suspen-
sion or revocation, something not possible under the present statute.' 1 3
To achieve the deterrent advantages of uniformity without placing judges
in a legislative straightjacket, the legislature should direct the preparation
of nonbinding, statewide sentencing guidelines. 114 Finally, the legislature
should provide the funding necessary for law enforcement agencies to
substantially increase their capacity to detect drunk drivers on the high-
way, and to inform the public of the nature of the DWI problem and the
stiff sanctions which may be imposed upon offenders. 115
B. Proposed Statutory Structure
This proposal would retain the substantive crime of DWI, including the
per se intoxication test. To facilitate plea negotiations, however, some
modifications of the present statutory scheme are required.
110. See note 104 supra.
111. Higher fines could contribute significantly to deterrence, especially if widely publicized and
strictly enforced. West Germany, for example, has very high fines for DWI (up to $1700 for each
offense) in addition to loss of driving privileges. H. PREISENDANZ, STRAFGESE rZBUcH 810-11 (1975).
In Sweden, the fines run as high as 10% of the offender's annual income. Waller, supra note 8. at
134-35. In both countries, the fines are proportional to the income of the defendant, so as to avoid a
regressive effect. The result has proven to be effective deterrence, largely because the stiff sanctions
are well-known and consistently imposed. Id. A complete fine schedule for all fifty states is contained
in TRAFFIC LAWS ANNOTATED, supra note 7, at 622-23.
112. See note 24 supra.
113. Placing restrictions on the driving privilege is one of the most effective, and certainly the
most appropriate, sanctions for drunk driving. Waller, supra note 7, at 132-33. Since most drunk
driving occurs between 9:00 PM and 6:00 AM, ALCOHOL AND HIGHWAY SAFETY REPORT, supra note 6,
at 35-41, a limitation on driving during those hours would be nearly as effective as a complete bar.
Waller, supra note 7 at 132-33. Judges should approve job-related driving permits readily. Id. at
132. Since complete suspension or revocation of one's driving privilege can lead to serious economic
and social consequences, including loss of employment, such tailored sanctions would be least likely
to interfere with the offender's employment and family life. Id. at 132-33. The continuity and stabil-
ity of job and family promotes treatment and rehabilitation. See Homaday, supra note 18, at 237-38.
See generally A. SMITH & L. BERLIN, TREATING THE CRIMINAL OFFENDER 262-70 (1974).
114. J. LITTLE, supra note 16, at 184-85. The legislature should also provide for regular judicial
training in sentencing alternatives. Id. See Comment, Sentencing Study, 52 WASH. L. REV. 103.
117-19 (1976) (sentencing guidelines as an alternative to unfettered judicial discretion).
Since judicial discretion is an essential part of our criminal justice system, the ultimate power for
setting individual sentences must remain in the hands of the judiciary. See notes 97-104 and accom-
panying text supra.
115. See notes 66-69 and accompanying text supra.
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The legislature should define two separate categories of DWI-'"Reck-
less DWI" and "Simple DWI. ' 11 6 Both categories should proscribe
driving or being in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while intoxi-
cated. "Reckless DWI" would have significantly more stringent penalty
provisions than "Simple DWI," the lesser included offense. By citing
drinking drivers whenever appropriate for the more serious offense, 
117
prosecutors, judges, and defense attorneys would have the necessary flex-
ibility to negotiate for guilty pleas within the ambit of the general DWI
statute. 118 This would reduce the problem of overloaded court dockets by
reducing the number of contested trials and appeals. It would, moreover,
involve the defendant in the sentencing process. The court and the offen-
der would be able to focus on future rehabilitation rather than on past
mistakes. 119
C. Treatment for the Problem Drinker
The criminal justice system is in a unique position to identify the need
for and supervise treatment of the problem drinker. 120 To achieve the dual
advantages of making highways less dangerous and attaining long term
rehabilitation of a significant number of problem drinkers, two major
changes are needed in the present statutory framework. First, provision
must be made for a diagnostic screening process upon conviction for the
116. The definitions of the offenses would be the same as DWI under the present statute, includ-
ing the per se intoxication provision, except that "Reckless DWI" would require the additional ele-
ment of,''wilful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property." See WASH. REv. CODE §
46.61.500 (1979).
117. The police officer would cite the offender for the more serious offense, as long as all the
elements of the offense have been committed.
118. See Blinder & Komblum, supra note 7, at 26 (necessity of flexible response). See gener-
ally, C. BRIDGE, supra note 6 (uniqueness of problem drinkers).
119. See sources cited in notes 126 and 130, 131 infra.
The statutory structure should also include the per se test for intoxication, defined as a BAC of
0.10% or higher. This would increase the likelihood of conviction by providing an objective, reason-
ably scientific standard enabling the government to more easily meet its burden of proof without
sacrificing fairness. This per se test, of course, is an integral part of the recent statutory change.
WASH. REv. CODE §§ 46.61.502(1), .504(1), .506 (1979). See generally Comment, Breath Alcohol
Analysis: Can it Withstand Modern Scientific Scrutiny?, 5 N. Ky. L. REv. 207 (1978) and sources
cited therein. See notes 41-43 and accompanying text supra.
120. Seminar Presentation by Dr. Eugene Purvis, Director, Navy Alcohol Rehabilitation Center,
San Diego, California, at Annual Navy Judge Advocate General Corps (JAGC) Conference, in Alex-
andria, Virginia (Oct. 23, 1979). Another expert suggests that the enforcement of DWI laws can be
an effective part of alcohol abuse treatment. "[A] D.W.I. apprehension serves as a case-finding
method for locating victims of the alcoholism epidemic. Once located, the victims can be offered
medical and rehabilitative services." Little, An Empirical Description of Administration of Justice in
DrunkDriving Cases, 7 LAw & Soc. Rv. 473,473 (1973). See note 129 infra.
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first DWI offense. Second, there must be a comprehensive, effective,
properly funded program for those in need of treatment for problem
drinking. 121
The statute currently provides for alcohol information school for first
offenders. 122 Only after the DWI offender has committed a subsequent
violation within a five-year period is the judge granted additional author-
ity to suspend a 180-day jail sentence conditioned upon alcohol treatment
or other appropriate condition. 1 23
The recommended proposal would permit the judge to order a diagnos-
tic examination after the first offense to determine whether the DWI
offender would benefit from treatment for alcohol or drug abuse. This
proposal is similar to the method outlined in the Uniform Vehicle Code 124
and now in effect in some jurisdictions. 125 The judge would then have
discretion to sentence offenders to sanctions appropriate for the offense,
which might include substantial fines, jail terms, and restrictions on driv-
ing. For a diagnosed problem drinker in need of treatment, much of the
fine and all of the jail term would normally be suspended contingent upon
successful completion of a rigorous alcohol treatment program. 126
121. COUNTERMEASURES PROGRAM, supra note 12, at 10.
122. WASH. REV. CODE § 46.61.515(l) (1979).
123. WASH. REV. CoDE § 46.61.515(2) (1979).
124. The relevant portion of the Uniform Vehicle Code provides:
(a) Before sentencing any person convicted for a first offense of violating § 11-902 [Driving
While Under Influence of Alcohol or Drugs], the court may, and upon a second or subsequent
conviction . . . shall, conduct or order an appropriate examination ... to determine whether the
person needs or would benefit from treatment for alcohol or drug abuse.
(b) After the examination, the court may impose penalties specified in this act or, upon a hearing
and determination that the person is an habitual user of alcohol or drugs, the court may order
supervised treatment on an outpatient basis, or upon additional determinations that the person
constitutes a danger to himself or others . . . . the court may order him committed for treatment
at a facility or institution approved by the (State department of health).
UNIFORM VEHICLE CODE § 11-902.2, reprinted in TRAFFIC LAWS ANNOTATED, supra note 7, at 643-44.
This section was added to the Uniform Vehicle Code in 1971 to authorize treatment of alcoholics
and drug addicts as an alterative to traditional penalties, which have not adequately controlled
drunk drivers .... [Ejnactment of UVC § 11-902.2 is recommended to complement [the Uni-
form Alcoholism and Intoxication Treatmeut Act] and to provide an important component for a
complete drunk driver countermeasures program.
TRAFFIC LAWS ANNOTATED, supra note 7, at 644-45.
125. Oregon, for example, has an excellent program for diagnosis, referral, and treatment of
alcoholics convicted of DWI in lieu of punishment. OR. REV. STAT. §§ 430.850, .860 (1977). See
also Kuttler & Farrell, D.W..-Jail or Rehabilitation, 47 FLA. B.J. 232, 232-34 (1973) (discussion
of successful DWI identification and rehabilitation program in Florida).
126. Any such treatment program might include total abstinence from alcohol (detoxification),
limited use of alcohol-reaction drugs such as disulfiram (Antabuse) or citrated calcium carbimide
(Tamposil), and systematic involvement with Alcoholics Anonymous, followed up with periodic
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An effective treatment program must be developed. The present Uni-
form Alcoholism and Intoxication Treatment Act, by an express excep-
tion, does not deal with drunk drivers. 127 Nor does the present DWI stat-
ute take sufficient account of the need for early identification and
treatment of the problem drinker. 128 Vital state interests require that this
gap be filled by a comprehensive treatment program for the problem
drinking driver. By integrating and properly funding the state policies
dealing with drunk drivers and alcoholics to the extent they coincide, the
goals of both programs would be enhanced. 12 9
progress evaluations. See D. ARMOR, J. POLICH, & H. STAMBUL, ALCOHOLISM AND TREATMENT 113-51
(1978). This is the.three-part program found to be effective in the highly-acclaimed Navy alcohol
treatment program. Seminar Presentation by Purvis, supra note 120.
While success is not assured, such a program of rehabilitation has an excellent chance to succeed in
any particular case. Blinder & Komblum, supra note 7, at 26-28. H. ERSKINE, ALCOHOL AND THE
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 22 (1972). See A. SMIrrH & L. BERLIN, TREATING THE CRIMINAL OFFENDER
262-70 (1974). See also notes 130-132 and accompanying text infra.
127. UNIFORM ALCOHOUSM & INTOXICATION TREATMENT AcT § 19(c).
128. WASH. REV. CODE § 70.96A.190(3) (1979).
129. The legislature committed itself to treating alcoholism and addiction as illnesses rather than
crimes by adopting the Uniform Alcoholism and Intoxication Treatment Act in 1972. WASH. REV.
CODE §§ 70.96A.010-.930 (1979). Enactment of complementary provisions is recommended to pro-
vide a vital component to a comprehensive drunk driver countermeasures program. See note 124
supra. Traditional sanctions should remain fully applicable to drunk drivers not diagnosed as problem
drinkers. See TEAFFIC LAWS ANNOTATED, supra note 7, at 643-45. See generally COUNTERMEASURES
PROGRAM, supra note 12, at 7-8.
Washington State does not, of course, have unlimited resources for treating problem drinkers. See
STATE OF WASHINGTON DFP'TOF SOCIAL & HEALTH SERVICES, WASHINGTON STATE ALCOHOLISM PLAN i-iv,
37-42, 89-92 (1977) (expenditures, revenues, and resources of state alcoholism programs). There is
also no guarantee of success in any given case. But convicted DWI offenders are an appropriate
group to screen for participation in a comprehensive treatment program for several reasons. First,
they represent, by their drunk driving, an immediate and substantial danger to society. Second, they
have, by their criminal conviction, involved themselves with the coercive power of the government:
Why not employ rehabilitative treatment rather than imprisonment? Third, by retaining control over
the offender in the form of suspended sentences and court supervision, the state can provide the
motivation the problem drinker may need. "Since [problem drinkers] do not voluntarily seek treat-
ment as a group, some outside incentive or coercion seems necessary." J. LrrTLE, supra note 16, at
37 (footnote omitted). See also Little, supra note 44. Finally, since referrals of DWI offenders by
judges will be spread out over time, there is not likely to be an unmanageable deluge of persons
requiring treatment. See WASHINGTON STATE ALCOHOLISM PLAN, supra, at 74-76 (estimation of the
need for alcoholism services in the state).
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A comprehensive program of this kind is likely to prove effective in
meeting a significant part of the problem. For although the problem
drinker may not be readily deterrable from driving while drunk, he is of-
ten treatable, 130 especially if properly motivated. 131 Because proper moti-
vation is so essential to success, no one should be forced to take part in
the recommended treatment program. 132 But the alternative sanctions,
even for a first offense, should be sufficiently onerous to strongly encour-
age all those diagnosed as alcohol or drug abusers to successfully com-
plete the treatment program. 133
130. Views on the treatability of alcoholic patients vary. Relevant factors include the lifestyle of
the alcoholic, the stage of the disease, and the alcoholic's motivation to succeed.
From the scanty information available, it would appear that the [recovery] prognosis for chronic
psychotic and Skid Row alcoholics [categories I and 2] is poor, and that less than 10 to 12
percent can obtain substantial aid from ordinary therapy. For the average alcoholic [category
3-usually married and holding down a job, who account for over 70% of alcoholics], the out-
look is far more optimistic.
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF MENTAL HEALTH, ALCOHOL AND ALCOHOLIsM 37 (1969). Drinking-drivers nearly
always fall into Category 3. See H. ERSKINE, ALCOHOL AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEMt 20-21 (1972);
Waller, supra note 8, at 125-29. Properly managed, drinking-driver treatment programs can have
dramatic results. In Minnesota, effectively structured treatment clinics reduced the number of repeat
offenders "to a negligible rate." DRINKING-DRIVER REPORT, supra note 9, at 23. See Note, Deterring
the Drinking Driver: Treatment vs. Punishment, 7 U.C.L.A.-ALASKA L. REV. 244, 259-60 (1978)
(discussion of successful treatment programs for DWI offenders). One treatment in Florida was
credited with reducing the one-year recidivism rate for DWI offenders from 20% to 1%. Kuttler &
Farrell, D.W.I.-Jail or Rehabilitation? 47 FLA. B.J. 232, 233 (1973).
131. F. GRAD, A. GOLDBERG, & B. SHAPIRO, ALCOHOLISM AND THE LAw 51-54 (1971). One expert
in the field of alcohol treatment has argued that the fatal consequences of the disease can be impressed
on any alcoholic with the will to live. Properly motivated, "alcoholism is ... 100 percent treatable."
Seminar Presentation by Purvis, supra note 120. See note 126 supra. See also COUNTERMEASURES
PROGRAM, supra note 12, at 7-8.
132. If there are grounds for invoking the involuntary commitment provisions of the Uniform
Alcoholism and Intoxication Treatment Act, WASH. REV. CODE § 70.96A.140 (1979), or its equiva-
lent in a comprehensive DWI statute, see note 124 supra, enforced treatment may be appropriate.
Any such involuntary commitment would require that the alcoholic be "incapacitated" or be "likely
to inflict physical harm on another." WASH. REV. CODE § 70.96A.140(l) (1979). Grounds for com-
mitment must be "established by clear, cogent, and convincing proof." Id. at § 70.96A. 140(4).
133. See TRAFFIC LAWs ANNOTATED, supra note 7, at 641, 644-45 (discussion of alternative sanc-
tions). Although not the focus of this comment, similar treatment should be made available to drug
abusers who are cited for DWI.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The amended drunk driver statute is an inadequate response to the
drunk driver crisis. The mandatory jail sanction is not likely to be more
than marginally effective as a deterrent to the proscribed conduct. Fur-
ther, it will result in a number of significant practical problems.
The problem of drunk driving is sufficiently complex and serious to
require an effective, comprehensive response to one of its major underly-
ing causes-unidentified problem drinkers in need of treatment. The rec-
ommended approach combines a set of stringent sanctions with a treat-
ment program for appropriate application by the trial judge. The
advantages stemming from such a frontal attack on the drunk driver crisis
3hould give the legislature cause to try again.
John T. Oliver
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